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The growing spatial polarization of presidential voting in the USA, 1992-2012: 
myth or reality?  
 
ABSTRACT 
There has been considerable debate regarding a hypothesis that the American electorate has 
become spatially more polarized over recent decades. Using a new method for measuring 
polarization, this paper evaluates that hypothesis regarding voting for the Democratic party’s 
presidential candidates at six elections since 1992, at three separate spatial scales. The findings are 
unambiguous: polarization has increased substantially across the country’s nine census divisions, 
across the 49 states within those divisions, and across the 3077 counties within the states – with the 
most significant change at the finest of those three scales. 
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Writing in 2005, Glaeser and Ward addressed what they termed five myths regarding American 
political geography, of which the second was that ‘The two parties [Republican and Democrat] are 
more spatially polarized than in the past’ (Glaeser and Ward 2005, 5). They claimed that ‘the number 
of states that can be considered “safe” for either party has not been rising over time’ and, using the 
well-established dissimilarity index for measuring spatial segregation, demonstrated that ‘county-
level evidence shows that segregation by party is not significantly increasing’ – although they did 
identify a ‘slight upward trend’ over the four elections 1992-2004 (their Figure 2 – p.39 – which 
shows a substantial increase from 1976 to 2004 of about 50 per cent in the index size). 
 
Three years later, in a much-discussed book (The Big Sort), Bishop and Cushing (2008) argued that 
electoral polarization had indeed been taking place over the preceding three decades, as a result of 
sorting processes consequent upon major volumes of inter-region, inter-state and inter-community 
migration. Their argument was not based on extensive, rigorous statistical analysis, however. For 
two presidential elections only – 1976 and 2004 (both of them close) – they defined counties as 
characterised by ‘landslides’ if one of the parties defeated the other by 20 percentage points or 
more. The number of such counties increased from 38 per cent of the total in 1976 to 60 per cent in 
2004, and the number of electors living in them grew from 27 to 48 per cent of  all those who voted. 
This was the core of their quantitative evidence sustaining their argument of increased polarization. 
 
Abrams and Fiorina (2012) published a major critique of The Big Sort, challenging both the 
conclusion that polarization had occurred and the processes – selective migration – that Bishop and 
Cushing claimed were the cause of that geographical outcome. Looking only at the first part of that 
challenge – whether spatial polarization had occurred – Abrams and Fiorina rightly criticised Bishop 
and Cushing for relying on two arbitrary end-dates (especially the first) to establish a trend, and they 
also questioned the use of the binary division of the country into ‘landslide’ and ‘non-landslide’ 
counties as the elements of the portrayal; other indices suggested to them that counties were 
becoming ‘increasingly politically heterogeneous, not increasingly homogeneous’ (Abrams and 
Fiorina 2012, 205). Nevertheless, they were careful in their concluding query and response: 
Do the preceding analyses prove that political residential segregation is not occurring? No. 
That is not our position. We are simply pointing out that Bishop’s sweeping argument about 
geographical political sorting has little or no empirical foundation. 
 
So who is right? Glaeser and Ward, Bishop and Cushing, or Abrams and Fiorina? In this brief note, we 
present an alternative, rigorous analysis of voting at presidential elections over the period 1992-
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2012.1 By using a sequence of elections we don’t entirely obviate the Abrams-Fiorina critique since 
the choice of end-dates remains arbitrary, but if we can establish a trend – especially a statistically 
significant trend – we are moving the argument substantially forward from that in the Bishop-
Cushing analysis. Despite Abrams-Fiorina criticising Bishop-Cushing for their use of presidential 
voting data – because how a county votes for president at a particular election may not be a good 
reflection of the local political ethos – nevertheless presidential elections are the only ones in which 
all US counties participate with the same two main candidates; because, as described below, our 
method is based on variances at each date the relative success of each party at each contest is 
partialled out. Our results simply explore trends in the pattern of voting for president across those 
six elections, and we make no greater claim that they are necessarily representative of wider 
changes in political attitudes and behaviour. 
 
Finally, Glaeser-Ward note that arguments regarding greater spatial polarization of the US electorate 
have also been made at the state scale. To establish whether polarization has occurred over the 
period at more than one scale, therefore, we use a recently developed procedure for measuring 
spatial segregation which is explicitly multi-scalar in its construction. 
 
MEASURING POLARIZATION/SEGREGATION 
 
There is a very large literature on the measurement of spatial segregation – which is the equivalent 
of spatial polarization. Almost all of it (as in Glaeser and Ward’s 2005 paper) uses single-number 
indices that are descriptive only; they lack a basis in formal inferential statistics, and so any 
judgement regarding their relative size is qualitative.2 If one wants to establish that polarization is 
greater at one date than at another, then a method is needed with which the statistical significance 
of any observed differences can be evaluated. Further, as clearly demonstrated by Carrington and 
Troske (1997), most of those indices based on the variance in a distribution over a set of spatial units 
systematically inflate the identified level of segregation because they confound systematic and 
random variation, especially where the spatial units are have relatively small numbers of people. 
 
Most studies of segregation/polarization using single number indices to assess its intensity are 
conducted at a single spatial scale only – such as counties in Bishop and Cushing’s (2008) book and in 
Lang and Pearson-Merkowitz’s (2015) parallel study to that reported here. But – as Glaeser and 
Ward (2006) indicate – there is a substantial literature exploring whether there is greater 
polarization in voting patterns at the state scale, and other work focuses on even broader scales, 
such as those of the nine census divisions. A full evaluation of any evolving spatial pattern thus 
requires exploration of trends at a variety of scales. However, as pointed out some decades ago 
(Duncan et al. 1961) but rarely taken into consideration since, any measure of segregation at one 
spatial scale necessarily incorporates its measure at any larger scales: if there is growing polarization 
at the state scale, for example, this is bound to be incorporated – to an unknown extent – at the 
county scale too and, as Jones et al. (2015) have argued, any measure of segregation at a micro-scale 
is likely to be over-stated if it does not ‘hold constant’ that measure at a macro-scale within which 
the micro-scale units are nested (e.g. counties within states). 
                                                          
1 The period that we study is shorter than that covered by Bishop and Cushing and was determined by the 
availability of a carefully collated data set covering those six elections between 1992 and 2012. Since Bishop 
and Cushing’s argument clearly implied a trend between 1974 and 2004 (later 2008) rather than a step-change 
at some point in the sequence, if we discover a significant trend in the twenty years studied here this would 
almost certainly validate their argument. 
2 Lang and Pearson-Merkowitz (2015) assess trends using inferential statistics, but their parallel approach to 
the study of polarization to that adopted here does not – unlike Glaeser and Ward, 2005 – deploy an index of 
polarization. Both Myers (2013) and Kinsella et al. (2015) use single-scale inferential measures of spatial 
clustering to identify changing intensity of polarization 
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To take both of these major criticisms of the standard measures of segregation into account, in this 
note we apply a recently-developed method for the analysis of residential segregation in cities 
(Jones et al. 2015), which subsequent work has demonstrated is clearly multi-scale in its organisation 
(e.g. Manley et al. 2015). We have modelled the proportion voting Democrat with the denominator 
as the total Democrat plus Republican vote. Those rates are then modelled within a multi-level 
framework, to obtain estimates of the intensity of segregation at each scale, net of segregation at 
the next largest scale and taking account of binomial variation occasioned by the varying 
denominators that form the proportion of those who vote Democrat. (Full details of the modelling 
strategy are in Leckie et al. 2012.) Thus each of the polarization measures reported here is for a 
particular spatial scale, independent of any polarization at a larger scale within which the specified 
units are nested. Polarization at the county scale, for example, is measured net of any polarization at 
the state scale; we are evaluating whether there is polarization across the states and then, 
independently, whether there is further polarization across counties within states – testing whether 
any observed differences across counties simply reflect differences between the states within which 
they are located. 
 
In work on multi-group segregation patterns – such of those of ethnic group residential segregation 
in cities – the derived segregation measure from this modelling approach is the Median Rate Ratio 
(MRR). Where just two categories are involved – such as voting either Republican or Democratic – 
we use the Median Odds Ratio (MOR), which can be interpreted in exactly the same way as odds 
ratios in logistic regressions. The MOR values are derived from the modelled (logit) variances in the 
rates at each scale, and they have associated Credible Intervals (CIs), which provide the degree of 
empirical support for the values of a parameter – here we have used the 95% intervals to convey the 
uncertainty; as they are based on Bayesian estimation, they can be asymmetrical around the 
estimated MOR value. 
 
MORs can be interpreted in the following way. Take a set of counties within a state for which we 
have the modelled rate. Take any pair of counties at random and calculate the ratio between the 
highest and lowest of the pair of modelled rates. Repeat this many times. The MOR is then the 
median value of the resultant distribution – the average difference between any pair of modelled 
rates; a value of 1 means that there is no polarization whatsoever. Further, because the measures 
are ratios, they can readily be compared: an MOR of 1.5 is 20 per cent larger than one of 1.25, for 
example, and so in comparing two measures we can not only assess how much larger one is relative 
to the other but also, using the associated Bayesian credible intervals, whether the two are 
significantly different from each other. 
 
Our chosen measure of the degree of spatial polarization is thus superior to the standard indices of 
spatial unevenness (such as the index of dissimilarity used by Glaeser and Ward 2005) because it: is 
readily interpretable; has associated credible intervals that allow for rigorous and robust estimates 
of differences over time; and separately identifies – again using credible intervals allowing for robust 
testing – the intensity of any observed differences at a number of spatial scales (in this case, three) 
independent of patterns at each of the other scales. With it we can estimate with confidence 
whether polarization is greater at some dates rather than others, and at some scales rather than 
others – and the combination of those two. It allows for a clear test of the spatial polarization 
hypothesis. 
 
SPATIAL POLARIZATION IN VOTING DEMOCRATIC AT THREE SCALES, 1992-2012 
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Any analysis of spatial polarization is necessarily arbitrary in its selection of the number and nature 
of scales to be included. In that reported here, we use three:3 the nine divisions used for reporting 
many statistical series by the US Bureau of the Census and which approximate to the political culture 
regions identified by Elazar (1972); the 49 states (excluding Alaska and the District of Columbia, 
which are not divided into counties or equivalent smaller areas for the reporting of vote numbers); 
and the 3077 counties – or county-equivalents – within those states.4 The variable whose spatial 
pattern is being modelled is the number of Democratic voters and the null hypothesis is that those 
voters are distributed across the counties (and thence the states and divisions) in proportion to the 
total number of Republican-plus-Democratic voters (i.e. we exclude votes for minor-parties). The 
data are a bespoke collection derived from the official returns published in each state after the 
relevant election.5 
 
The resulting MORs, with their associated CIs, are shown in Figure 1. Those in the left-hand diagram 
are for the nine census divisions; those in the central diagram are for the 49 states, net of any 
variations between divisions (i.e. the MORs are the average odds ratios in each year between pairs 
of states within each division – and so are net of any inter-division variation); and those in the right-
hand diagram are for counties within each state (i.e. the average ratio between pairs of counties 
selected at random within a state, and thus net of any inter-state, inter-division variation). 
 
All three diagrams provide clear evidence of growing polarization at the selected scales. There was 
greater polarization in Democratic voting over the period 1992-2012 across the nine divisions – i.e. 
there was greater segregation of Democratic voters into some divisions relative to others. (The MOR 
value for 2012 – 1.55 – was 29 per cent larger than that for 1992 – 1.20.) There was greater 
polarization in Democratic voting over the period 1992-2012 between states within the nine 
divisions – i.e. there was greater segregation of Democratic voters into some states within each 
division relative to others although that increased polarization was less than occurred at the 
divisional scale (a 12 per cent increase to 1.36). And there was greater polarization in Democratic 
voting over the period 1992-2012 between the 3077 counties within states – i.e. there was greater 
segregation of Democratic voters into some counties relative to others within each state (the MOR 
increased by 14 per cent to 1.69). 
 
These clear upward trends at each scale vary in the statistical significance of the differences in the 
MOR values at any pair of dates. At the divisional scale, the CIs are large and – not surprisingly given 
                                                          
3 A strong case can be made for the inclusion of other scales, as in the micro-scale variations in Texas explored 
by Myers (2013) and in Cincinnati by Kinsella et al. (2015), but such data are not available for a country-wide 
analysis. 
4 One of the very useful reviews of a first version of this paper raised the issue of weighting counties according 
to their populations. In most states, county populations vary widely, and are positively skewed (there is a small 
number of large counties and a larger number of small ones). This is important, as shown by Firebaugh’s 
(2003) analysis of global income inequality which is found to be increasing in an unweighted analysis that 
treats each country as a unit but decreasing in a weighted analysis that takes China’s huge population into 
account. In the present analysis the size of the population (defined as the number of voters who are 
Democrats plus Republicans in each county at each election) is taken into account through an underlying lower 
level in the manner set out by Browne et al. (2005).  This views the proportions voting Democrat at the County 
level as consisting of replicated binary responses for individuals at the lowest level. As there are no predictors 
at the individual level the information content of the proportions modelled here as a binomial is exactly the 
same as individual binary outcomes estimated as a  Bernoulli model and the same results will be obtained but 
more efficiently (as explained in Subramanian et al 2001). Put simply the analysis is not based on just the 
proportions who voted Democrat for they are weighted by the total voters – the so-called binomial weights. 
 
5 The data were collected and collated by Clark Archer, Fred Shelley and Bob Watrell, and we are extremely 
grateful to them for allowing us to use their material in this study. 
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the small number of observations (nine) – overlap: there is no convincing statistical evidence that 
polarization was significantly greater at any one later date compared to an earlier one – even the CIs 
for 2012 overlap slightly with those for 1992. However the estimates do not show trendless 
fluctuation as the pattern is one of consistent increasing polarization.  
 
At the state scale, too, the number of observations (of states within divisions) is fairly small, and the 
CIs are relatively wide as a consequence – though much less so than at the divisional scale. The 
modelled MOR for 2012 is significantly greater than that for 1992, however, indicating that by the 
end of this relatively short period there was greater polarization in voting Democratic at that scale 
than there was at its beginning. The states were less divided – net of the divisional changes – in their 
support for Bill Clinton than they were for Barack Obama. 
 
The modelled MOR values at the state scale are much smaller (and significantly so) than those 
shown in the diagram for the county scale. Finally, for counties, within-states, within-divisions, 
polarization was relatively high at the start of the period (an MOR of 1.48, 48 per cent larger than a 
value of 1.0 which would indicate no polarization) and substantially larger still (at 1.69) twenty years 
later. Further, after the first two elections in the sequence, the MOR for each contest was 
statistically significantly larger than that for the previous election, giving very strong evidence of 
greater polarization over time at that finest of geographical scales analysed. 
 
It is also possible to decompose the total logit higher level variance (Browne et al. 2005) between 
the three scales at each date, and the resulting percentages are shown in Table 1. These indicate a 
substantial shift across the two decades, with the percentage of the variance between divisions 
more than doubling whereas that between counties within states declined by a comparable amount; 
there was no change in the percentage associated with between states within divisions. Across the 
six elections, therefore, whereas the differences at the macro-scale between divisions have become 
more accentuated, those at the micro-scale between counties within states have become less. In 
relative terms the fine-grained patterning at the start of the period – accounting for over two-thirds 
of the variance across the map – has become less important whereas the coarser-grained 
differences at the macro-scale of the nine divisions have become more pronounced. Thus while the 
absolute change as shown clearly in Figure 1 has seen increasing polarization at all three levels the 
greater proportion of it has been at the most macro level but this does not mean that in absolute 
terms the between-county  variation has decreased – quite the contrary.  This difference between 
absolute and relative change poses a further set of questions to be addressed in exploring the 
reasons behind these changing and increasingly important electoral geographies. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
This brief note has deployed a new method of measuring polarization/segregation, derived from a 
multi-level modelling strategy based in Bayesian statistics, at multiple scales. It has provided clear 
evidence that over the period 1992-2012 the US electorate has become more polarized across the 
country’s nine divisions; that within those divisions it has become more polarized across their 
component states; and that within the states it has become significantly more polarized across their 
component counties. In terms of absolute values – i.e. the estimated MORs – the greatest 
polarization over the period has occurred at the largest of those scales (the divisions), but in 
statistical terms, using the standard measure of significance, the clearest changes have occurred at 
the smallest of the three scales analysed – the counties. At that scale, the evidence is very clear: 
polarization increased over the twenty years – within a context of increased polarization at both of 
the scales within which the counties are nested. 
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This conclusion does not necessarily contradict Glaeser and Ward’s. Their study was concerned with 
a much longer time-span and their chosen measure suggested the same trend as identified here for 
much of the shorter period we have analysed. Our – more sophisticated – measures focus on the 
trends in that shorter period and emphasise their strength. Nor do our findings directly counter 
Abrams and Fiorina’s argument, since they only concluded that they had identified no convincing 
evidence of the greater polarization claimed by Bishop and Cushing. Our analyses have provided 
such evidence, not only at the county scale but also at two larger scales as well, although the 
statistically strongest conclusions apply to the counties. 
 
Any statistical study of this type is constrained by its choice of data, time period and spatial scales to 
be analysed and its findings should not be over-generalised; as Abrams and Fiorina suggest, analyses 
of other data, periods and scales may produce different findings (all spatial analysts are aware of the 
importance of the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem, for example: see Wong 2009). Nevertheless, the 
findings reported here provide strong – if not conclusive – support for Bishop and Cushing’s claims 
regarding the changing electoral geography of the United States over recent decades. Whether that 
change is because of a ‘big sort’ or the operation of other processes remains open to assessment: 
the analyses reported here have provided clear evidence that the question needs to be asked. The 
multilevel analyses reported here do not address the processes underpinning the observed greater 
polarization: Bishop and Cushing argued that these involved selective migration, a contention 
sustained by a number of recent studies (Cho et al. 2013; Gimpel and Hui 2015; McDonald 2011), 
Further research into those processes is clearly called for given the strong evidence of greater spatial 
polarization adduced here: a clear pattern calling for explanations has been established. 
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Table 1.  
Decomposition of the Higher-level Variance into the Percentage of the Total at the Three Spatial 
Scales 
 
Year Divisions States Counties 
1992 14.6 16.6 68.8 
1996 21.5 19.1 59.4 
2000 30.9 17.4 51.7 
2004 31.9 15.1 53.0 
2008 36.3 13.8 49.9 
2012 33.2 16.8 50.1 
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Figure 1. The polarization trends at the three spatial scales, showing the MOR values and their 
associated CIs. The MOR values for counties are net of any differences between states, and those for 
states are net of any differences between divisions. 
 
   
 
 
